We use tests for structural change to identify periods of low, positive, and negative Taylor rule deviations, the difference between the federal funds rate and the rate prescribed by the original Taylor rule. The tests define four monetary policy eras: a negative deviations era during the Great Inflation, a positive deviations era during the Volcker disinflation, a low deviations era during the Great Moderation, and another negative deviations era from 2001 to 2015. We then estimate Taylor rules for the different eras. The most important violations of the Taylor principles, the four elements that comprise the Taylor rule, are that the coefficient on inflation was too low during the Great Inflation and that the coefficient on the output gap was too low during the Volcker disinflation. We then analyze deviations from several alterations of the original Taylor rule. Between 2000 and 2007, Fed policy cannot be explained by any variant of the Taylor rule while, between 2007 and 2015, Fed policy is consistent with a rule where the federal funds rate does not respond at all to inflation and either responds very strongly to the output gap or incorporates a time-varying equilibrium real interest rate.
Introduction
The Taylor principle that the nominal interest rate should be raised more than point-forpoint when inflation rises, so that the real interest rate increases, has become a central tenet of monetary policy. Satisfying the Taylor principle is both necessary and sufficient for stabilizing inflation in a model with an IS Curve, Phillips Curve, and Taylor rule such as Taylor (1999b) and is sufficient but not necessary for determinacy of inflation in a model with a forward-looking IS Curve, a New Keynesian Phillips Curve, and a Taylor rule such as Woodford (2003) . 1 The Taylor principle is embedded in the Taylor (1993) rule. According to the Taylor rule, the policy interest rate (the federal funds rate in the U.S.) equals the inflation rate plus 0.5 times the inflation gap, inflation minus the target inflation rate, plus 0.5 times the output gap, the percentage difference between GDP and potential GDP, plus the equilibrium real interest rate.
With the target inflation rate and the equilibrium real interest rate both set equal to 2.0, the rule simplifies to the policy rate = 1.0 + 1.5 * inflation + 0.5 * output gap. With the coefficient on inflation being greater than one, the Taylor rule necessarily satisfies the Taylor principle.
The converse, however, is not correct, as satisfying the Taylor principle is necessary, but not sufficient, for adhering to the Taylor rule. There are four elements in the Taylor rule, which we call the "Taylor principles". The first element, discussed above, is that the coefficient on inflation equals 1.5. Following standard practice, we say that the first Taylor principle is satisfied if the coefficient on inflation is greater than and significantly different from one. The second element is that the coefficient on the output gap equals 0.5, so that the nominal (and real) interest rate increases when the output gap rises. We say that the second Taylor principle is satisfied if the coefficient on the output gap is greater than zero, less than one, and significantly different from both zero and one. Both the first and second principles are symmetric, so that the real interest rate decreases when inflation and/or the output gap falls. Satisfying the first and second principles serves to stabilize business cycle fluctuations.
The third element is that the target inflation rate equals 2.0 percent. This target has been adopted either implicitly or explicitly by many central banks, and has been an explicit target of the Fed since January 2012. The fourth element is that the equilibrium real interest rate be constant and equal to 2.0 percent. Because neither the inflation target nor the equilibrium real interest rate are estimated, the criteria for satisfying the third and fourth Taylor principles will not have an exact statistical interpretation.
Until recently, most research on Taylor rules focused on the first principle. Starting with Taylor (1999a) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , many researchers have found that the Taylor principle was satisfied in the 1980s and 1990s, but not in the 1960s and 1970s. 2 The second principle became prominent following the Great Recession. Yellen (2012) argued that a modified
Taylor rule, with a coefficient of 1.0 instead of 0.5 on the output gap, was preferable to the original Taylor rule. 3 In contrast to the original Taylor rule, the modified rule implies negative policy rates starting in 2009 which, combined with the zero lower bound on the federal funds rate, provides a justification for quantitative easing and forward guidance. The third principle, that the target inflation rate equals 2.0 percent, has been questioned in the aftermath of the Great Recession by, among others, Wiliams (2009) , who argues that a 2 percent inflation target may provide an inadequate buffer against the zero lower bound. The fourth principle, that the equilibrium real interest rate equals 2.0 percent, has traditionally received relatively little attention in the policy analysis literature. This has changed, however, as Summers (2013 Summers ( , 2014 ) advocated conducting policy based on an equilibrium real interest rate that is zero or even negative and Yellen (2015) argued that the federal funds rate should be lower than that prescribed by the original Taylor rule for a considerable period of time going forward because the equilibrium real interest rate was close to zero.
This paper proposes a new approach to policy evaluation with Taylor rules. Instead of choosing periods a priori or on the basis of changes in estimated parameters, we select periods based on Taylor rule deviations, defined as the difference between the federal funds rate and the policy rate prescribed by the original Taylor rule described above. Using structural change tests, we divide the sample into various periods and estimate Taylor rules over the periods. We then investigate the implications of altering the original Taylor rule to incorporate a higher coefficient on the output gap and/or a time-varying equilibrium real interest rate. We use real-time data on real GDP and the GDP deflator from 1965:4 -2015:3, the last quarter before the federal funds rate was raised above the zero lower bound, and construct output gaps using real-time quadratic detrending. We replace the federal funds rate with the shadow federal funds rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2016) Why do we care about high and low deviations eras? There is an extensive literature that considers the normative implications of Taylor rules. Taylor (1993) describes how the rule was derived from optimal policy in estimated macroeconomic models, Woodford (2003) emphasizes the importance of a time-varying equilibrium real interest rate for optimality, and Yellen (2012) discusses how a modified Taylor rule is closer to optimal policy from the Fed's macroeconomic model than the original Taylor rule. Taylor (2012) presents qualitative evidence that economic performance is better in "rules-based" than in "discretionary" eras. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, Papell, and Prodan (2014) provides quantitative evidence that economic performance is better in low deviations eras than in high deviations eras using either the original or the modified Taylor rule as   the prescribed rule and Nikolsko -Rzhevskyy, Papell, and Prodan (2016) extend this result to almost all Taylor rules with a coefficient on the inflation gap of 0.3 or higher. 4 It is often argued that normative analysis of policy rule deviations cannot be conducted without establishing optimality of the rule in the context of a macroeconomic model. The problem, however, is that a rule which is optimal for one model is often not optimal for another model. For example, Taylor and Wielend (2012) show that the optimal policy rule for the Smets and Wouters (2007) model has a higher coefficient on the inflation gap than on
We estimate Taylor rules for the various eras in order to understand (1) what factors contribute to the high deviations eras and (2) whether the factors were the same for the positive and the negative deviations eras. The coefficient on inflation is greater than and significantly different from one, so that the first Taylor principle holds, for the 1980 -1987 and 1987 -2000 periods. Between 1965 and 1979 , the coefficient on inflation is close to and not significantly different from one, so that the first Taylor principle is not satisfied. This is in accord with much previous research, and reinforces the evidence that the violation of the Taylor principle was an important contributing factor to the high inflation in the 1970s. Between 2001 and 2015, the coefficient on inflation is greater than but not significantly different from one.
The coefficient on the output gap is relatively close to Taylor the output gap and Tetlow (2015) shows that the optimal policy rule for the 2007 vintage of the FRB/US model has a higher coefficient on the output gap than on the inflation gap. Wieland, Afanasyeva, Kuete, and Yoom (2016) provide additional evidence on the robustness of various policy rules. 
where φ α + = 1 and *
Taylor postulated that the output and inflation gaps enter the central bank's reaction function with equal weights of 0.5 and that the equilibrium level of the real interest rate and the inflation target were both equal to 2 percent, producing the following equation,
We define Taylor rule deviations as the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the interest rate target implied by the original Taylor rule with the above coefficients. 
Real-Time Data
The implied Taylor rule interest rate is calculated from data on inflation and the output gap.
Following Orphanides (2001) , the vast majority of research on the Taylor rule uses real-time data that was available to policymakers at the time that interest rate setting decisions were made. The We construct inflation rates as the year-over-year change in the GDP Deflator, the ratio of nominal to real GDP. While the Fed has emphasized different inflation rates at different points in time, real-time GDP inflation is by far the longest available real-time inflation series. An alternative would be to splice together a series from the emphasized inflation measures at different points in time. Even if it was possible to construct such a series with real-time data (and it is not), this would risk finding spurious evidence of different eras based on spliced data.
In order to construct the output gap, the percentage deviation of real GDP around potential GDP, the real GDP data needs to be detrended. 6 We use real-time detrending, where the trend is calculated The three leading methods of detrending are linear, quadratic, and Hodrick-Prescott (HP).
Real-time output gaps using these methods are depicted in Figure 1 . In contrast with output gaps constructed using revised data, where the trends are estimated for the entire sample, there is no necessity for the positive output gaps to equal the negative output gaps. While there are considerable differences among the gaps, the negative output gaps correspond closely with NBER recession dates for all three methods. to the implied Taylor rule rate, the actual federal funds rate is too low in the mid-to-late 1970s, too high in the early 1980s, and too low in the early-to-mid 2000s. This is consistent with Taylor (1999 Taylor ( , 2007 . The shadow federal funds rate is below the implied Taylor rule rate for 2010 -2015.
The most widely used alternative to the original Taylor rule increases the size of the coefficient on the output gap from 0.5 to 1.0, producing the following specification.
We call this rule the modified Taylor rule. Rudebusch (2010) and Yellen (2012) use variants of this rule to justify unconventional policies after the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound.
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Deviations from the modified Taylor rule are depicted in Figure 3 . Panel A shows the federal funds rate (actual and shadow) and the modified Taylor rule rate implied by Equation (4). 
We call this rule the time-varying Taylor rule. If the equilibrium real interest rate is constant and equal to 2.0, Equations (3) and (5) are identical.
Since the equilibrium real interest rate is unobservable, there is no consensus about how it should be measured. In Woodford (2003) , the natural rate of interest is the real interest rate required to keep aggregate demand equal at all times to the natural rate of output or, equivalently, keep the output gap equal to zero. Laubach and Williams (2003) apply the Kalman filter to jointly estimate time-varying equilibrium real interest rates and the output gap. The Laubach and Williams (LW) rate is a long-term trend level consistent with stable inflation and output equal to the natural rate.
We use the LW one-sided estimates updated through 2015. 
Full Sample Estimates
In order to provide a benchmark for our later results, we estimate, using real-time data, a independently identify the inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate in Equation (1) from the estimates in Equation (6). If, however, you are willing to assume a value for the equilibrium real interest rate, you can back out a value for the inflation target (or vice versa).
Assuming that the equilibrium real interest rate equals Taylor's postulated value of 2 percent, the implied inflation target is 3.42 percent, considerably larger than Taylor's 2 percent inflation target.
Conversely, assuming that the inflation target equals 2 percent, the implied equilibrium real interest rate is 1.16, considerably lower than Taylor's 2 percent postulated value.
When estimating Taylor rules, it is common practice to have a weighted average of the lagged federal funds rate and the Taylor rule variables. Our purpose, however, is to investigate why policy deviated from the Taylor rule (original and alternative) benchmark at various times rather than to estimate interest rate reaction functions that produce the best fit. In order to investigate the sources of the deviations, we need for the estimated policy rules to be consistent with the postulated policy rules, which preclude adding lagged interest rates to the Taylor rule. 
Estimates with Structural Change
In order to identify monetary policy eras, we use Perron (1998, 2003) tests for multiple structural breaks, allowing for changes in the mean of the policy rule deviations. We consider the following multiple linear regressions with m structural breaks (m+1 regimes):
where dt are the policy rule deviations from Equations (3) - (5) 16 Taylor rules with real-time data can be estimated with OLS because the inflation rate and output gap are predetermined when the federal funds rate is realized. 17 In principle, interest-rate-smoothing rules derived from optimizing models with a coefficient of one on the lagged interest rate, as in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) can be used for the postulated policy rules. In practice, however, deviations from these rules cannot distinguish between high and low deviations eras using structural change tests. 
Taylor Rule Deviations
Using the Bai and Perron test we find three significant breaks in the mean of the Taylor   rule We estimate Taylor rules for each of the four eras. Between 1965 and 1979, the coefficient on inflation is 1.12 and not significantly different from one, so that the first Taylor principle is not satisfied. This is in accord with much previous research, and reinforces the evidence that the violation of the Taylor principle was an important contributing factor to the high inflation in the 1970s. The coefficient on the output gap, 0.49, is very close to Taylor's postulated coefficient of 0.50 and is significantly different from both zero and one. Using the estimates of the intercept and the coefficient on inflation, you can back out an estimate for the inflation target by assuming that the equilibrium real interest rate equals two and can back out an estimate for the equilibrium real interest rate by assuming that the inflation target equals two, but you cannot identify both parameters independently. If the first Taylor principle does not hold, however, the model does not identify an inflation target as the Fed simply increases the policy rate point-for-point with inflation.
Since the estimated coefficient on inflation is close to and not significantly different from one, we cannot calculate an inflation target during this period.
The deviations from the Taylor During this period, the intercept of 3.24 is much higher than the postulated value. With a two percent inflation target, these coefficients imply a 4.22 percent equilibrium real interest rate.
A two percent inflation target, however, seems unrealistically low for the period. With an inflation target of four percent, which is arguably more plausible, the implied equilibrium real interest rate is 5.20. Since the average equilibrium real interest rate for the period is 3.30 for the Laubach and
Williams estimates, these equilibrium rates do not appear to be plausible. Alternatively, with a two percent equilibrium real interest rate, the coefficients imply a -2.53 percent inflation target, which is obviously implausible. The magnitude of the Taylor rule deviations during the Volcker disinflation period cannot be explained by a combination of any or all of the Taylor principles.
One interpretation of these results, suggested by Taylor (1999a) , is that Volcker needed to raise the federal funds rate above the implied Taylor 
Modified Taylor Rule Deviations
Applying the Bai and Perron test to the modified Taylor rule deviations in Equation (4), we identify four significant breaks in the mean of the Taylor rule deviations and, therefore, five regimes. The results are reported in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 5 two, which is clearly plausible for the period, the implied equilibrium real interest rate is -1.11
percent. This value is not remotely plausible, and shows that, despite the higher output gap coefficient, Fed policy from 2000 -2007 cannot be well-described by the modified Taylor rule.
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The estimates for 2007 -2015 are very different from those in any of the previous eras.
The inflation coefficient is 0.50, the output gap coefficient equals 0.68, and the intercept equals 1.57. The first Taylor principle is that the coefficient on inflation is significantly greater than one, so the real interest rate increases when inflation rises. Between 2007 and 2015, the coefficient on inflation is not even significantly greater than zero. These results are in accord with a view of monetary policy during and following the Great Recession that, because inflation was low and close to target and unemployment was high and persistent, the Fed didn't respond to small movements in inflation but responded strongly to the output gap. Assuming that the inflation target equals two, the implied equilibrium real interest rate is 0.57. This is within the range of estimates discussed by Williams (2015) .
What does it mean for the coefficient on inflation to be small and not significantly different from zero? In order for the coefficient α in Equation (2) to equal zero, the coefficient on the difference between inflation and target inflation φ in Equation (1) so that the nominal interest rate would differ from the equilibrium nominal interest rate, the sum of the equilibrium real interest rate and the inflation target, by an amount depending on the output gap. From the estimates in Table 2 , the equilibrium real interest rate would equal 0.06, the intercept of 2.06 minus the inflation target of 2.0. Since the coefficient α in Equation (2) is greater than zero, although not significant, the implied equilibrium real interest rate is higher.
An alternative interpretation of this result comes from the models of King (2000) and Woodford (2003) , where the first term in the Taylor rule is the inflation target rather than the inflation rate.
In this formulation, the coefficient on the difference between inflation and target inflation φ in Equation (9) needs to be greater than one for the first Taylor principle to hold. If the Fed doesn't respond to small movements in inflation, the coefficient φ = 0 and Equation (9) becomes Equation (8). While this is algebraically identical to the result above, a coefficient of φ = 0 in Equation (9) seems more intuitive than a coefficient of φ = -1.0 in Equation (1).
Taylor Rule Deviations with a Time-Varying Equilibrium Real Interest Rate
An important characteristic of the New Keynesian model is a time-varying equilibrium real interest rate in the Taylor rule, so that the policy rate responds to changes in the equilibrium real rate independently of changes to inflation and the output gap. We evaluate monetary policy in the context of such a rule by testing for structural change in the deviations from the time varying equilibrium real rate Taylor rule described by Equation (5). We calculate the equilibrium real interest rate by using the estimates in Laubach and Williams (2003) 
(LW).
The results of the Bai and Perron tests are reported in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 5 
Conclusions
Monetary policy analysis is typically conducted by estimating Taylor rules over various periods. The periods are either chosen a priori or selected based on changes in the estimated policy coefficients. The innovation in this paper is to estimate Taylor rules over monetary policy eras that are defined, using structural change tests, based on the deviations of the federal funds rate from the rate prescribed by the original Taylor rule, a modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient, and a version of the Taylor rule with a time-varying equilibrium real interest rate.
Adherence to and departures from the Taylor rule are often analyzed in terms of the Taylor principle that the coefficient on inflation should be greater than and significantly different from one. The Taylor rule, however, consists of four elements, which we call the Taylor principles, and departures from any of the principles can cause deviations from the rule. The first Taylor principle is described above. The second Taylor principle is that the coefficient on the output gap should be greater than zero, less than one, and significantly different than both. The third Taylor principle is that the inflation target should equal 2.0 and the fourth Taylor principle is that the equilibrium real interest rate should also equal 2.0. We proceed to conduct structural change tests and estimate Taylor 
